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In this study we examine the relation between ownership structure and corporate 
performance; the sample of the study included 42 out of 48 companies of all sectors in 
Bahrain Bourse in five years from 2007-2011. Several dimensions of ownership 
concentration were studied in addition to managerial and institutional ownership. Two 
different measurements of performance were used (ROA and Tobin’s Q). The study 
investigated this relation using several control variables and 2SLS statistical method to 
overcome the problem of endogeneity that may exist between the study variables. It was 
found that ownership concentration have a negative effect with statistical significance on 
company performance. Institutional ownership was found to have a positive effect on 
company performance. Managerial ownership was not found to have a significant effect 
on company performance, however it was found that managerial ownership has a positive 
effect on performance only in the case of declining ownership concentration. Other 
results were revealed by the study regarding company age, size, growth, board size and 
liquidity. The study is considered to have theoretical and practical implications. It 
contributes to the debate about agency theory and managerial entrenchment. It also may 
help officials in Bahrain in making laws and legislations concerning corporate 
governance improvement in Bahraini market.  
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The relation between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied 
intensively by many researchers interested in corporate finance. This area of research is 
receiving a growing amount of interest due to the mixed results that have been obtained. 
Most studies were conducted in the Anglo Saxon market environment, however, those 
results cannot be generalized to other market environments due to the differences found 
in each one of them. Ownership structure is receiving much attention due to its 
correlation with agency theory and corporate governance. The mixed results may be 
justified because of the different dimensions found in ownership. The most important 
dimensions that will be focused on are ownership concentration and managerial 
ownership. This relation was discussed early (in 1932) when Berle and Means discussed 
the role of management and majority versus minority shareholders in the performance of 
a company. Traditional agency theory emphasises the potential conflict between 
unmonitored management and widely dispersed shareholders. The vast majority of 
studies conducted in USA focused on this conflict. However, in other market 
environments, like the European market and some emerging economies, ownership is 
much more concentrated which creates majority and minority shareholders creating a 
potential conflict that may affect the company performance, especially in the absence of 
laws and legislation that protect minority shareholders.  
 
Recently the debate moved from the USA to other markets around the world to identify 
how ownership structure affects firm performance under the different market 
circumstances found outside the Anglo-Saxon markets. This study is concerned with 
exploring that relation in an emerging small market in the GCC, which is the Bahraini 
market. Few studies have been undertaken on that issue in the GCC and in the Bahraini 
market in particular. This study aims to cover this gap by providing evidence from 
Bahrain that contributes to the current ongoing debate on the relation between ownership 
and firm performance. This study gains in importance in view of the intensive efforts by 
the Bahrain Monetary Agency to promote Bahrain as an international financial centre 
(Hussain & Mallin, 2003). So, it is crucial to take a closer look at the Bahraini market 
that will benefit researchers, investors and law makers to improve the Bahraini market in 
serving the vision of the Bahraini Monetary Agency. 
 
Related Literature and Hypothesis 
The core of this study lies in agency theory and managerial entrenchment argumentation. 
It provides new empirical evidence in the ongoing research on ownership structure 
attempting to uncover the diverging interests of different kinds of shareholders and how 
this may affect company performance. Agency theory suggests that concentrated 
ownership will result in better monitoring of the management which makes ownership an 
important element in corporate governance. This, in turn  improves company 
performance. Some studies such as Demesetz and Lehn, 1985; Demesetz and Vilalonga, 
2001; Kumar, 2003; Rowe and Davidson, 2002 found that there is no significant 
relationship between concentrated ownership and company value. Other studies such as 
Pivovarsky, 2003; Sanda, Mikailu and Garba, 2005; Joh, 2002; Xu and Wang, 1997 
found a significant relationship between the two variables. Some studies found a positive 
but insignificant relationship between the two variables (McConnell & Servaes, 1990).  






Traditional agency theory claims that more concentrated ownership would enhance the 
ability of shareholders to monitor management of the company, preventing it from taking 
self-serving decisions affecting the performance of the company negatively. This claim 
may be true in market environments where laws and legislation protecting minority 
shareholders are strong like the USA. Concentrated ownership creates majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders with diverging interests and objectives. In a 
market environment where laws protecting minority shareholders are absent or weak, a 
situation of majority shareholders controlling the company will be created and the 
performance of the company would be affected negatively. Theoretically, it may be said 
that an increase in ownership concentration should lead to a reduction in the costs of 
separation of ownership and control benefiting company performance eventually. 
However, the larger shareholders may benefit from that improvement privately at the 
expense of smaller shareholders.  This study aims at investigating the effect of 
concentrated ownership on performance in the Bahraini market which is considered to be 
an emerging market and it is not mature in regard to the laws protecting minority 
shareholders. The study claims that concentrated ownership in a weak law market 
environment affects performance negatively.  
 
The first hypothesis of the study may be:  
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
company performance. 
 
 Many studies were interested in finding out the effects of ownership on performance but 
the results varied widely. In a study of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), they 
investigated the effect of insider ownership on company value in the US market and 
found a non-monotonic relationship between the two variables. This evidence was 
explained through “incentive and entrenchment integrated theory”. Researchers also 
found conflicting results regarding managerial ownership as some found a positive 
relationship (Severin, 2001; Kumar, 2003). Others did not find that relationship (Demsetz 
& Villalonga, 1999; Rowe & Davidson, 2002; Long & So, 2002). 
 
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and company 
performance.  
 
 When managerial ownership exceeds a certain limit, management becomes more 
entrenched. This would lead the management to work on its own private interests at the 
expense of small shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that the combination of 
ownership and control may allow concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for 
private rents. Researchers have studied widely the effect of ownership concentration, 
which determines the percentage of cash flow rights, and the identity of the main owner 
of the company, to determine the effect of that on company performance. According to 
many studies in the field of ownership structure, family business is believed to be the 
most common type of ownership that exists in the world. Some studies believes that 
family owned companied suffer from severe governance problems (Perrini et al., 2008)  
as their main goal is to maintain the chief executive position in the family and to invest in 
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low risk projects to ensure the long lasting survival of their business. On the opposite 
direction, other studies believe that there is a positive correlation between family control 
and company performance because it mitigates the problem of free riding by management 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Although this debate exists in accordance with family 
ownership and control, few studies put other types of concentrated ownership structures 
such as institutional and managerial ownership under the microscope to investigate its 
relation to company performance. Studies that were conducted in the US market could 
not find a significant relation between several types of ownership and performance. Other 
studies also found little impact on performance (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Holderness, 
2003). Most studies neglected the dimensionality of ownership, thus previous findings of 
no relation between ownership and performance may be justified.  Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) found evidence that ownership structures do not affect performance 
and explained that any maximized returns come from the interplay of market forces. 
However, Welch (2003) investigated the multi dimensionality of ownership structure and 
found that institutional ownership and managerial ownership are part of an endogenous 
system that should be considered when performing other studies concerning the effect of 
ownership on performance. Their results suggested that higher proportions of institutional 
ownership resulted in better company performance, measured by T’Q (Tobin’s Q). 
Berger, 2003 and Sarac, 2002 found a positive relationship with a moderate statistic 
effect between institutional ownership and firm value. Others, like Wan (1990), found a 
positive, statistical and significant correlation between the two variables. 
 
H3: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and company 
performance. 
 
 In a different kind of markets (the Greek market), Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) 
found that more concentrated ownership results in better performance. Perrini et al., 2008 
also found that managerial ownership does not represent a mechanism of reducing agency 
costs in concentrated companies in a study that was conducted in the Italian market. In 
this study we will focus on the Bahraini market to anticipate the effect of ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership taking into consideration the different nature of 
this emerging market. The Bahraini market is one of the small markets in the Gulf region. 
It is considered to be a market with a concentrated ownership (Khamis et al., 2015; 
Hamdan & Sartawi, 2013). Bahrain has a 30 years vision of becoming an international 
financial center, thus it is focusing more on upgrading its financial market to having the 
best governance practices and a good investment environment. Khamis, et al., (2015) 
which was conducted in the Bahraini market found that institutional ownership is the 
most common type of ownership in Bahrain and institutional ownership had a positive 
effect on company performance.           
 
In Turkey, Sarac, (2002) conducted a study on a sample of 138 Turkish manufacturing 
companies. The results showed a relation between ownership structure and net profit. It 
also proved that there is a positive relation between institutional ownership and 
profitability.  
  





A study by Tsegba and Ezi-Herbert, (2011) was conducted on a sample of 73 companies 
listed on the Nigerian Stock exchange. It investigated the relation between ownership 
structure and performance. It concluded that there is a negative relation between 
ownership concentration and performance. There was also a negative relationship 
between insider ownership and performance. The last finding was that there is a positive 
but insignificant relation between foreign ownership and performance. Kumar, (2003) 
investigated the relation between ownership structure and performance using ROA 
measurement on a sample of 5,224 Indian companies from 1994 to 2000. He found 
evidence that institutional ownership and managerial ownership are related to 
performance. Nadia (2004) explored the impact of ownership structure on 15 private 
banks listed in Amman Stock exchange. The study found that there is a high 
concentration of ownership in Jordanian banks although this did not affect performance 
which was measured using the accounting measurement Returns On Assets (ROA).    
 
Another study which was conducted in Jordan was by Jaafar and El-Shawa, (2009) on a 
sample of 132 Jordanian companies listed on the Amman Stock exchange from 2002 to 
2005. The study examined the influence of ownership concentration and board 
characteristics on performance. The study found that ownership concentration, board size 
and multiple directorships has a significant and positive relationship with performance.  
 
Bjuggren, Eklund and Wiberg (2007) explored the relationship between ownership 
structure and performance in Swedish companies from 1997 to 2002. The study found 
that using dual class shares, which give different voting rights and dividends to public 
shareholders and founders of the company, has a negative effect on company’s 
performance. Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta (2008) used a sample of companies in the Italian 
market from 2000 to 2003 to explore the relation between ownership structure and 
performance. It concluded that ownership concentration of the five biggest shareholders 
of the company has a positive influence on firm valuation while management ownership 
benefited only less concentrated ownership companies. A study conducted by Sulong and 
Nor, (2008) on Malaysian listed firms, investigated the effect of dividends, ownership 
structure and board governance on firm value. It found that concentrated ownership and 
managerial ownership have insignificant effect on firm value which was unexpected. 
 
Data and Methodology: 
This part includes two sections. Firstly, a discussion of the study sample and sources of 
data. Secondly, a section discussing the measurement of variables and variable 
descriptions.  
 
Sample and Resources of Data: 
The Bahrain Bourse contains (48) listed companies. Companies were selected according 
to the following criteria: data is available in the period of (5) years (2007 to 2011). 
Companies have not been closed or merged with any other company during the study 
period. We start the sample collection process with all the listed firms on the Bahrain 
Bourse for the period of (2007-2011). We obtain data on financial statements, board 
composition, and ownership structure from Bahrain Bourse Database. Six companies 
were excluded from the sample and they were either non Bahraini or were closed during 
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the study period, which left us with 42 companies representing 87.5% of the original 
sample.  
 
Measuring of Variables and Variable Descriptions: 
The selection of variables is based on an examination of previous empirical studies, table 
1 shows the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the control variables 
employed for all estimated models of the study.  
 
Regarding ownership concentration: We notice from table no. 1 that the percentage of 
ownership for the first stockholder in Bahraini companies exceeds 33% and in some 
companies, the percentage exceeds 85% of shares, which may be considered a high 
concentration of ownership. The mean values of ownership percentages for the second 
stock holder was less than that, in average it was 14% and it reaches 32% maximum. The 
same may be said about the other indicators of ownership concentration as ownership 
percentage declined for other levels of ownership. In general, the top five stock holders in 
the Bahrain Bourse companies own more than 55% of stocks which indicated high levels 
of ownership concentration.   
 
Another indicator of ownership concentration was used which is Concentrated ownership 
dummy. Company is given (1) if the first stockholder owns more than 50% of stocks. It 
was noticed in table 1 that the mean for this variable is 0.231 which indicates that first 
stock holder owning more than 50% in Bahrain Bourse is not common.  Multiple 
blockholders dummy variable gave the company (1) if there was more than two 
stockholders owning more than 10% of the stocks and it was a common thing in Bahrain 
Bourse as the mean of this variable was 0.667.  Financial ownership dummy variable was 
inserted in the study to identify the role of financial institutions ownership in improving 
firm performance. It was measured by giving (1) for companies that one of its investors is 
a financial institution. The mean for this variable was 0.718 which indicates a high 
financial institutions ownership in Bahraini companies.    





Table 1: The measurement of variables and descriptive statistics: 
Variable Description 
Descriptive statistics 
Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Ownership Concentration: 
Ownership first shareholder (%) Fraction of shares owned by the first largest shareholder. 33.688 19.017 0.000 85.470 
Ownership second shareholder 
(%)  Fraction of shares owned by the second largest shareholder. 
14.045 7.687 0.000 32.150 
Ownership third shareholder (%) Fraction of shares owned by the third largest shareholder. 6.586 6.300 0.000 21.330 
Ownership fourth shareholder (%) Fraction of shares owned by the fourth largest shareholder. 2.916 4.219 0.000 13.340 
Ownership fifth shareholder (%) Fraction of shares owned by the fifth largest shareholder. 0.923 2.260 0.000 8.550 
Ownership 5sh (%) 
 
Fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholders 
together. 
55.321 26.165 10.453 94.510 
Managerial ownership (%) Fraction of shares owned by the executive directors. 5.227 11.609 0.000 47.140 
Concentrated ownership dummy 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the controlling 
shareholder has more than 50% of the shares. 
0.231 0.422 0.000 1.000 
Multiple blockholders dummy 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if there is another owner 
with at least 10% of the shares, and zero otherwise. 
0.667 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Financial ownership dummy 
 
Dummy variable that equals one if the largest controlling 
ultimate shareholder is a financial institution. 
0.718 0.451 0.000 1.000 
Corporate performance: 
Return on Assets The ratio of the net income to the total assets. 3.782 9.749 -45.400 24.340 
Simple Tobin's Q 
 
Is the (Market value of equity + Book value of short term 
liabilities)÷Book value of total assets. 
1.024 0.374 0.201 2.336 
Control variables: 
Foreign ownership Fraction of shares owned by the foreign investors. 28.298 27.340 0.000 94.510 
Institutional ownership Fraction of shares owned by the Institutional investors. 49.358 28.249 0.000 94.766 
Firm size (Millions) Logarithm of the company’s total assets. 981 2,282 5 12,344 
Financial leverage Total debt divided by total assets. 41.734 29.723 0.000 93.413 





The natural log of the number of years that a firm is listed 
on an exchange. 
25.560 12.576 1.000 54.000 
Board size Size of the board of directors. 8.714 2.078 4.000 13.000 
Growth Percentage increase in sales from previous year. -4.035 32.553 -100.000 122.096 
Liquidity ratio Weight of cash and cash equivalents on total assets. 9.549 12.878 0.000 79.940 
Industrial dummy Dummy variable that equals one for industrial companies. 
 
  





Ownership Concentration, Performance and other Variables: a Preliminary 
Analysis:  
Analysis found in table 2 shows the mean of variables in companies that top five 
stockholders ownership is concentrated and other companies that top five stock holders 
ownership is not concentrated. 
 








5sh > 56.08%) 
(Ownership 5sh ≤   
56.08%) 
Ownership Concentration: 
Ownership first shareholder (%) 44.778 20.750 0.000 
Ownership second shareholder (%) 18.439 8.919 0.000 
Ownership third shareholder (%) 8.648 4.180 0.000 
Ownership fourth shareholder (%) 3.488 2.249 0.041 
Ownership fifth shareholder (%) 0.823 1.039 0.506 
Ownership 5sh (%) 76.175 33.424 0.000 
Managerial ownership (%) 1.434 9.039 0.000 
Corporate performance: 
Return on Assets 2.469 5.042 0.066 
Simple Tobin's Q 0.955 1.091 0.011 
Control variables: 
Foreign ownership 40.551 16.245 0.000 
Institutional ownership 69.004 30.242 0.000 
Firm size (Millions) 1289740.949 721888.090 0.082 
Financial leverage 43.897 39.400 0.287 
Firm Age 29.683 20.950 0.000 
Board size 8.619 8.650 0.914 
Growth -0.046 -0.041 0.923 
Liquidity ratio 8.250 11.401 0.175 
 
In table 2 it can be noticed that companies with low ownership concentration had better 
performance indicators (ROA & T’Q). The difference was statistically significant at 10% 
using ROA and at 5% using T’Q. Companies with high ownership concentration had 
lower performance indicators. It was noticed also that companies with high ownership 
concentration had higher foreign and institutional ownership. The difference was 
statistically significant at 1%. Companies with higher ownership concentration were 
companies with larger size, higher age, higher leverage and with less liquidity and 
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Models and Empirical Study:  
Like most empirical corporate finance research, the analysis of the relationship between 
ownership dimensions and firm performance faces the challenge of endogeneity, which 
can arise from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality. In the 
context of the ownership–performance relationship, the problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity arises when one or more latent variables drive the observed relationship 
between ownership dimensions and firm performance. 
 
To check the validity of the study models and data, several tests were performed like, 
normal distribution test, time series stationarity test, autocorrelation and multicolinearity 
and models were checked for not having homoscedasticity. Errors were corrected and 
results are believed to be accurate.  
 
 This study tries to find the effect of ownership dimensions on company 
performance. Thus, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, and institutional 
ownership are considered as independent variables and company performance is 
considered as the dependent variable. The study also uses two different measurement 
tools to measure the dependent variable (company performance). The first one is simple 
Tobin’s Q formula and the second one is Return on Assets (ROA) formula. The estimated 










itititititit ControlrInstitOwneManagOwnerOwnerConceePerformanc   
The study hypotheses aim at investigating the effect of ownership concentration, 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership on performance. Company 
performance was measured by two indicators, Tobin’s Q and ROA. Three main 
independent variables were inserted to represent the study hypotheses (Ownership first-
fifth shareholder (%), Ownership 5sh (%), Concentrated ownership dummy, Multiple 
Blockholders dummy, and Financial ownership dummy), managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership.  Many control variables were added to the model, and they were: 
managerial ownership, company size, company age, financial leverage, board size, 
growth, liquidity, sector and year.  
 
To reach precise results about the relation between ownership structure and performance. 
The study used Two-Stage Least Squares 2SLS to overcome endogeneity. Results are 
shown in table 3.     
 
Testing the first hypothesis: the relation between ownership concentration and 
company performance: 
 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and 
company performance. 
 
Morck et al., (1988), claimed that diffuseness of ownership would weaken the monitoring 
power on management or it may be an advantage to the management by not letting any 
block shareholders control the firm in their favor against minority shareholders. The 
concentrated ownership creates a majority shareholders and minority shareholders with 





diverging interests and objectives. In a market environment where laws protecting 
minority shareholders are absent or weak, a situation of majority shareholders controlling 
the company will be created and the performance of the company would be affected 
negatively. 
 
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares 2SLS Results: 
Variable 












Constant 19.609 2.520 0.034 2.448 4.737 0.000 
Ownership Concentration: 
Ownership first shareholder (%) -0.172 -2.156 0.034 -0.016 -3.097 0.003 
Ownership second shareholder 
(%) 0.553 2.450 0.017 -0.013 -0.872 0.386 
Ownership third shareholder (%) -0.265 -1.269 0.209 -0.011 -0.820 0.415 
Ownership fourth shareholder (%) 0.410 1.740 0.086 0.007 0.464 0.644 
Ownership fifth shareholder (%) -0.175 -0.567 0.573 -0.048 -2.334 0.022 
Ownership 5sh (%) -0.189 -2.002 0.048 -0.012 -0.782 0.771 
Concentrated ownership dummy -3.181 -0.834 0.407 0.042 0.166 0.868 
Multiple blockholders dummy -2.542 -1.042 0.301 0.022 0.135 0.893 
Financial ownership dummy 0.355 0.217 0.829 -0.050 -0.459 0.648 
Managerial ownership (%) 0.096 1.640 0.105 0.004 1.161 0.250 
Institutional ownership 0.108 1.982 0.051 0.010 2.792 0.007 
Control variables: 
Foreign ownership -0.224 -4.000 0.000 -0.012 -3.159 0.002 
Firm size (Millions) 0.000 1.772 0.081 0.000 1.474 0.145 
Financial leverage -8.308 -2.300 0.024 0.329 1.372 0.174 
Firm Age 0.016 0.225 0.822 -0.001 -0.185 0.854 
Board size -1.402 -1.707 0.092 -0.153 -2.812 0.006 
Growth 3.887 1.566 0.122 0.002 0.011 0.991 
Liquidity ratio -0.086 -1.457 0.150 -0.002 -0.396 0.694 
R Square 0.543 0.489 
Adjusted R Square 0.434 0.367 
F-Statistic 4.972 3.998 
p-value (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 
t-Critical: at df 209, and confidence level of  99% is 2.326  and level of 95% is 1.960and 
level of 90% is 1.645. 
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 210-10-1 = 199) and (df for numerator =β =11 and 
confidence level of 99% is 2.34 and confidence level of 95% is 1.84 and confidence level 
of 10% is 1.6. 
Significance at: *10%; **5% and ***1% levels.  
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Many ownership concentration indicators were used in this study. It can be seen from 
table 3 that the percentage of ownership for the first stockholder has a negative effect on 
performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q. The percentage of 
ownership for the second, third, fourth and fifth owners did not have an effect on 
performance with statistical significance, excluding  ownership of the second largest 
owner relation with ROA and relation between fifth largest owner with  T’Q.  Ownership 
5sh (%) which summarizes the top five ownerships and its relation with performance, had 
a negative relation with performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q. 
Based on that, the first hypothesis may be accepted as it was shown that there is a 
statistical significant negative relation  between ownership concentration and company 
performance. This result is consistent with (Abuserdaneh, Zureikat & Al- Sheikh, 2010) 
where they found a negative and statistically significant relation between ownership 
concentration and performance in the Jordanian market. When ownership of a company 
is concentrated, this creates a group of controlling shareholders that would protect their 
interests rather than the interests of the company itself or minority shareholders affecting 
negatively on the performance of the company.   
 
Testing the second hypothesis: The relation between managerial ownership and 
company performance: 
 
This dimension is related to the agency theory, as it suggests that management should be 
owning shares in the company to prevent it from working for its own interests. However, 
when management owns a large proportion of the company, it is also expected to work 
for its own favor.  
 
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and company 
performance.  
 
The relation between managerial ownership and performance was positive but not 
statistically significant. Thus, the second hypothesis may be rejected. This can be 
justified by the minimal proportion of managerial ownership that exists in Bahraini 
market. The results may not reflect the actual situation. It is also consistent with what was 
found by researchers like (Severin, 2001; Kumar, 2003). 
 
Testing the third hypothesis: The relation between institutional ownership and 
performance :  
 
Fama, (1980), indicated in his study that institutional ownership improves firm 
performance, many studies like (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) found that institutional 
ownership would affect performance in two ways: the first one that it makes outside 
block shareholders overcome the controlling managers and the second one is: that it 
would reduce the free rider problem which arise from the lack of shareholders control. 
Institutional ownership is the most common form of ownership structure in Bahrain 
Bourse (Khamis et al., 2015).  
 





H3: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and company 
performance. 
 
2SLS analysis in table (3) shows that there is a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and performance using ROA at 5% and T’Q at less than 1%. This result is 
consistent with what was found in some studies like (Wan, 1990) (Khamis et al., 2015) 
and partially with what was found by others like (Berger, 2003; Sarac, 2002). 
 
 Further Results:  
The results of testing the study models shown in table 3 reveals a negative relationship 
with statistical significance between foreign ownership and performance in Bahraini 
companies. Although researchers assume that foreign investors may enhance the 
performance of a company, as they bring experience and technology. However, this 
assumption was not proven in Bahraini market, as foreign ownership had a negative 
effect on performance. The distance and reduced amount of information may weaken the 
ability of foreign investors to improve performance of Bahraini companies. This is 
consistent with other studies that found the same relation like (Solung & Nor, 2008).   
Company size had a positive relation with performance but was not statistically 
significant. The results regarding the effect of financial leverage on performance were 
conflicting. It had a negative effect on performance using ROA and a positive effect 
using T’Q but it was not statistically significant. Company age did not have any effect 
with statistical significance on performance using ROA and T’Q. Board size had a 
negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less than 1% using 
T’Q company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical significance on 
performance in Bahraini companies.    
 
The effect of managerial ownership on the relation between ownership 
concentration and company performance:  
A question may be raised about the role of managerial ownership in performance when 
ownership is concentrated and on which level of concentration; managerial ownership 
could have a positive effect on performance?  The study analyzed the relation between 
concentration, performance and managerial ownership. Results of 2SLS for this relation 
are shown in table (4). Managerial ownership does not have positive effect on 
performance except in the situation when ownership concentration declines as on the 
fourth ownership concentration. This is consistent with what was found by (Perreni et al., 
2008) when they found that managerial ownership is beneficial only in non-concentrated 
firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position in the firm to extract 
private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders by appointing managers that 
represent its own interest. These results contrasted what was found in the study of 
(Khamis et al., 2015) where managerial ownership was found to have a negative effect 
with statistical significance on performance when using T’Q however it found the same 
result of having positive effect without statistical significance on performance when 
using ROA. This difference may be explained by the use of different statistical 
techniques which is 2SLS in this study to reduce the endogeneity effect in this relation, 
while in the previous study used OLS. 2SLS is considered to be more accurate and 
reflecting actual relation between the variables of this study.   




Table 4: The effect of managerial ownership on the relation between ownership 
concentration and performance: 
Variable 






Constant 0.230 3.982*** 0.122  4.032*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Managerial ownership*first 
shareholder 
-0.007 -1.157 0.013  0.336 
 (0.249)   (0.737) 
Managerial ownership*second 
shareholder 
0.051 1.569 0.008  0.036 
 (0.119)   (0.971) 
Managerial ownership*third 
shareholder 
-0.155 -2.921*** -0.022  -5.761*** 
 (0.004)   (0.000) 
Managerial ownership*fourth 
shareholder 
0.223 2.205** 0.057  7.595*** 
 (0.029)   (0.000) 
Managerial ownership*fifth 
shareholder 
0.092 1.402 0.034  1.466*** 
 (0.163)   (0.174) 
Control variables:      
Foreign ownership 0.004 0.131 -0.004  -2.510** 
 (0.896)   (0.014) 
Firm size (Millions) 0.002 1.841* 0.003  1.161 
 (0.068)   (0.249) 
Financial leverage -17.493 -7.288*** -0.304  -1.092 
 (0.000)   (0.278) 
Firm Age 0.139 2.453** 0.008  2.516** 
 (0.015)   (0.014) 
Board size 0.710 1.686* 0.073  1.844* 
 (0.094)   (0.069) 
Growth 11.130 5.778*** 0.045  0.334 
 (0.000)   (0.739) 
Liquidity ratio -0.075 -1.504 0.001  0.431 
 (0.136)   (0.668) 
R Square 0.455 0.576 
Adjusted R Square 0.412 0.515 
F-Statistic 10.629 9.503 
p-value (F-Statistic) 0.000 0.000 
t-Critical: at df 209, and confidence level of  99% is 2.326  and level of 95% is 1.960and level of 90% is 
1.645. 
F-Critical (df for denominator n-β-1 = 210-10-1 = 199) and (df for numerator =β =11 and confidence level 
of 99% is 2.34 and confidence level of 95% is 1.84 and confidence level of 10% is 1.6. 
Significance at: *10%; **5% and ***1% levels.  





Board size had a negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less 
than 1% using T’Q company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical 
significance on performance in Bahraini companies.    
 
Conclusion, Study Limitations and Recommendation: 
The main objective of this study was investigating the relation between ownership 
structure and company performance in the Bahraini market. The study investigated the 
relation between ownership concentration, taking into consideration several dimensions 
of concentration to analyze the relation intensively on different levels. It also studied the 
effect of institutional and managerial ownership on company performance. Ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership are part of agency theory and they are important 
aspects of corporate governance. Institutional ownership was studied because it was 
found to be the most common type of ownership that exists in Bahraini market (Khamis 
et al., 2015). The study found many results regarding the relation between its variables 
and their effect on company performance.  
 
Ownership concentration was studied using different dimensions; the percentage of 
ownership for the first stockholder had a negative effect on performance with statistical 
significance using ROA and T’Q. The percentage of ownership for the second, third, 
fourth and fifth owners did not have an effect on performance with statistical 
significance, excluding ownership of the second largest owner relation with ROA and 
relation between fifth largest owner with  T’Q  Ownership 5sh (%) which summarizes the 
top five ownerships and its relation with performance, had a negative relation with 
performance with statistical significance using ROA and T’Q. 
 
The relation between managerial ownership and performance was positive but not 
statistically significant. The study also analyzed the relation between concentration, 
performance and managerial ownership. Managerial ownership does not have positive 
effect on performance except in the situation when ownership concentration declines as 
on the fourth ownership concentration. This is consistent with what was found by 
(Perreni et al., 2008) when they found that managerial ownership is beneficial only in 
non-concentrated firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position in 
the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders by appointing 
managers that represent its own interest. 
 
The study found that there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
performance using ROA at 5% and T’Q at less than 1%. A negative relationship with 
statistical significance between foreign ownership and performance in Bahraini 
companies was also found. Company size had a positive relation with performance but 
not statistically significant. The results regarding the effect of financial leverage on 
performance were conflicting. It had a negative effect on performance using ROA and a 
positive effect using T’Q but it was not statistically significant. Company age did not 
have any effect with statistical significance on performance using ROA and T’Q. Board 
size had a negative relation with performance using ROA at less than 10% and less than 
1% using T’Q. Company growth and liquidity did not have any effect with statistical 
significance on performance in Bahraini companies.  
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The study is considered to be limited because it studies performance in companies in a 
period of five years only (2007-2011). This time series may be unstable because the 
global financial crisis occurred during this period. Future studies may take longer and 
different time series. The study was conducted in the Bahraini market and it is considered 
to be a small sample to be studied in an emerging market. Further studies may be 
conducted on the whole GCC market, because the GCC economies are considered to 
have a lot of similarities in lows and the nature of the economies. The study encourages 
officials to reveal data concerning family ownership. This factor was not studied because 
data regarding it is not available. However, family ownership exists in the Bahraini 
market. The most important output of this study was the recommendation for officials to 
improve the Bahraini market laws to enhance corporate governance to a level that all 
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